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tice to do so. 
!d.-Appeal-Harmless error m 
of instruction on reasonable doubt which stated that 
reasonable doubt is >SUth doubt as has "some reason" for 
its existence out of evidence in the case," and that 
it means an "actual and substantial doubt out of the 
nature of the eYidence" in case, did not con-
for reversal under cireumstances pre-
vailing, eould not haYe been eonfus<•d or defendant 
prejudiced. 
Id.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Counsel.-Where cer-
tain letters which were writter1 defendant his wife were 
introduced in evidence him in uxoricide case to show that 
she was reconciled with him, alleged misconduct of prosecuting 
attorney, who had represented defendant 
divorce action which did not come to trial but was 
in questioning defendant concerning other letters which had 
not been introduced in evidence by defendant may not be 
successfully asserted on appeal in absence of at time 
that it was prosecuting knowledge" that 
prompted him to defendant to such cross-examination. 
[12] Id.- Conduct of CounseL-Prosecuting was not 
guilty of questioning of defendant in that "if 
he [defendant] it up, I'm going to have to take the 
stand," where such statement was made after at-
torney had defendant size of book with 
which defendant stated his wife had struck his son and de-
fendant, who refused to answer, did not understand what was 
expected of him, and that by quoted words prosecuting at-
torney meant that he would have to take the stand to testify 
as to size of hook. 
[13] Id.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-Defendant in uxoricide case was not prejudiced by 
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case that witness went to sheriff's officce when 
ahout victim's death may not on 
of misconduct was made in trial 
in any event, such matter was immaterial 
fendant's or mnocence. 
Ll8] Homicide-Evidence.~Evidenee sustains conviction 
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death in uxoricide case, defendant did not fire 
fatal where it shows that crime was result of 
over of time on 
APPEAL taken under Pen. § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County 
and from au order a new triaL B. Hawkins, 
,Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. of conviction imposing 
death affirmed. 
Edmund G. Doris II. Maier and 
Prederick G. for Re-
and 
indictment with the murder 
"'""~··~vu on about March 1953. Clarence 
13 years of age, was certified to the 
against him suspended. Defendant 
pleaded not and not guilty by reason of insanity. After 
a jury trial, he vvas found guilty of murder in the first degree 
without recommendation; he was also found sane at the time 
the crime was committed. Defendant's motion for a new trial 
on both pleas was denied. The appeal is automatic (Pen. Code, 
§ 1239, subd. b). 
The of the prosecution, in essence, was that Henry 
Simpson counseled, advised, and encouraged (Pen. Code, § 31) 
his 13-year-old son, Clarence Simpson, to kill Vivian Simpson, 
the wife of Henry and mother of Clarence ; that such crime 
was the result of premeditation and planning over a period 
of time on the part of Henry, Clarence, and a 14-year-old 
school friend of Clarence, one Jimmie Jones. Defendant and 
Clarence both the planning and premeditation, although 
Clarence admits aiming the gun at his mother and killing her 
with one shot through the chest. It is the main contention 
of the defendant that the testimony of Jimmie Jones, being 
an accomplice, is uncorroborated. Defendant denied that 
there was a plan made with Clarence and Jimmie to kill Vivian 
and claimed that Jimmie told him the gun went off when Clar-
ence stumbled over a stake. 
BACKGROUND 
Henry Simpson and Vivian Dodge met in 1937, or 1938, in 
Porterville, California, and shortly thereafter commenced liv-
ing together. Both parties had been previously married and 
Vivian had an infant son, Donald Dodge, living with her. 
In 1939, Clarence was born and in 1942, the couple were 
married. Two other sons, Billy and Gary, were subsequently 
born to them. The Simpsons moved several times selling, at 
different times, grocery stores, an auto court, and a poultry 
ranch until 1952 when Henry traded a ranch near Escalon 
for a home at 1117 Herndon Road, in Stanislaus County. 
557 
. The 
and the evidence shows numerous 
of both. Defendant testifird that Vivian 
was "No " and "whore"; that she had sexnal relations 
\Yith other men; that she beat and threatened the children. 
A i one time Vivian had defendant arrested for 
her with a >veapon at which time she left him for sev-
eral weeks; at another defendant commenced a divorce 
action Vh·ian but dismissed it. At still 
another time, defendant had a warrant issued for Vivian's 
arrest because she had been beating the children; a witness 
testified, ho\vever, that the action was taken to " even with 
her" for haYing had him arrested. About this time, defend-
ant commenced another divorce action and the children were 
placed in the custody of the juvenile court. Both the criminal 
adion ancl the diYorce snit against Vivian were dismissed 
and the children were returned to the couple who started liv-
together again. 
Sueh was the background to the events which culminated 
in the shooting of Vivian on March 10, 1953. 
TESTDIONY m' Jnnrm JoNES 
,Jimmie Jones testified that on Friday afternoon, 1\Iarch 6, 
J 953, defendant, and Clarenee were at the Holm A venue 
house whieh <lefendant was engaged in remodeling. ,Jimmie 
testified that defendant told him he wanted him, ,Jimmie, to 
be a witness for him and Clarence-that they were going to 
]\ill ViYian. Aceording to Jimmie's story, it was :first sug-
gested that Clarence use a baseball bat to kill his mother 
and then put a knife in her hand to make it look like self-
defense. 'l'his plan ·was rejected by the boys. It was then 
sugge~o;ted that a fishing trip be planned for a week from the 
following Saturday; that the boys bring a rifle into the house, 
pretend to be cleaning it, and that Clarence would '' acciden-
tally" shoot his mother. Jimmie testified that he spent most 
based On an aCCUSation auc;,.;c;u"L.Y 
he and Clarence had stolen a watch 
and some money from the Curtis home where she worked 
when had been there to her home in the 
car driven defendant.) Jimmie testified that defendant 
had told them that committed the would 
but "to leave him out of it so he could get 
us a and after it was over he would get us a car and 
a gun and we would go on a that summer and have a lot 
of fun and everything'' ; for them to stick to their (of 
an accidental shooting) and that ''after it was over and we 
stuck to our and everything came out all he would 
us a ear, a gun, and going to take us on a trip that 
summer, back to Arizona and Nevada, or some place back 
there .... We were going to have a lot of fun fishing and 
stuff, and catch horses. . . . Yes, wild horses, and bring them 
out here.'' He also testified ''. . . he told us when we went 
on a fishing to bring the gun in the living room and 
kind of wrastle around over it and we would accidentally shoot 
Mrs. Simpson. That was to be done on the following Sat-
urday.'' 
Jimmie testified that on Monday, March 9, he and Clarence, 
at defendant's took the gun out of the house and 
across the and put it in between the rafters and wall of 
a house which was being built by a man by the name of ''Bill'' 
(later identified as one Bill to hide it; that later 
that night he and Clarence got the gun from its hiding place 
and put it in defendant's truck. 
Concerning the day of the Jimmie testified that 
after school, about 4 o he and Clarence went to the 
Simpson home and did the chores; that they went to the Holm 
A venue house where defendant was working and that defend-
ant again repeated the plan to them. After supper, the boys 
rode their bicycles to Roy Lutz' house to see if Mrs. Simpson 
was there; that after returning from there they "went in the 
house and went in and laid clown on the boys' bed and were 
reading books of some sort when the smallest boy, Gary, came 
Oct. 1954] PEOPLE ·v. SIMPSON 
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in and told Clarence and I that Mrs. 
papers that to Mr. or some-
and Clarence walked over to her bedroom and 
the curtains hack and with it. 
She said that she was them that be-
both her and Mr. that both of them had 
them Clarence wasn't the boss of her. 
''Then she went out of the room and Clarence-or 
went in and the box and it in to me where 
there was a broken window in the bedroom. I gave it to Clar-
ence outside of the window and he it under an old screen 
outside the house. Then we went back to the 
sat down on the '' Jimmie testified then that 
Mr. and Mrs. about their property, 
or and when defendant went outside and the 
small boy, started to follow that Mrs. Simpson 
followed the defendant and outside; that Clarence and 
he also went out to the He stated that "Just before 
Mr. started to go out he called Clarence and I out 
and told us we would have to do it that He didn't give 
us any reason except she was to get us if we didn't 
get her, we would have to do it that night. Then he took the 
two boys and went down to the U.C.Lf','-L"'~''-"· 
"He went to the ""''"''")'JL 
name of Bill-Bill Parker, I think, 
Clarence and I followed him down. ·when we there 
Clarence said something about, 'Do we have to do it now.' or 
something. Mr. Simpson was talking to Bill, \Ye couldn't hear 
the conversation. . . . I don't remember the exact words he 
said. All I heard was 'do it now.' And Mr. when he 
was through to went back up to the house, 
then he went in. '\V e followed him in. 'l'hen started-
then the started over Gary .... Then after 
were out on the Clarence and I followed them out .... 
Mr. started to go outside; went to follow him. 
Mrs. him, said he could with her, and 
Mr. Simpson said if he wanted to go with him, if wanted 
to go with him, to let him come. Then Mrs. Simpson said 
'No, he could away from Mrs. 
Simpson, was to go with Mr. so I took him 
out in the kitchen to get a drink. Mr. Simpson went outside, 
Gary followed him out. Mrs. Simpson went out to get Gary 
and she took abold of one arm of Gary and Mr. Simpson had 
the other; they were having a tug of war over I looked 
SrMPSO!'r C.2d 
towards the truck so I turned 
gun out. It 
he said he couldn't it came 
I took ahold of the cloth and he took the gun and run 
up the There was a cloth around 
the gun. Then he run there 
the clothesline and I the ashecms. :l\Irs. 
walked west of the 
looked around. I looked over at Clarence in time to see 
him raise the gun and fire. . . . I seen him raise it to 
his shoulder and aim and he fired. l\Trs. tnrm~d a 
little bit and I'm to di(~.' 
vV ent over to the east of the and 
Clarence and I run up there. Clarence tossed the gun up 
the house and Mr. Simpson came over and bent down 
over Mrs. Simpson to feel of her face or \Vhcn 
he stood up, Clarence 'Is she dead Did it \York ' He 
said, 'I'm afraid so, son, I'm afraid so.' ... Then Mr. Simp-
son says, 'You tripped over that stake there, didn't you Clar-
ence?' He said, 'Yes.' He said, 'vVell, stick to that,' he said. 
'Did you eject the cartridge?' Clarence said, 'Yes.' He said, 
'vVhat did you do that for?' He said, 'I don't know.' Mr. 
Simpson said, 'Oh, well, it's all right now,' lw said, 'you stick 
to the story. They can't do anything to yon. Be sure to put 
on a good sob story, and leave me out of it.' Then he went 
over to the neighbor's. While he was gmw Clarence and 1 
went out, walked around looking for the shell. \Ve couldn't. 
find it, so we went over and told ... I told Clarence if we 
were going to stick to that story, he had to put his foot up 
against the horseshoe peg. After we got through doing· that we 
came back. The neighbor came back with Mr. Simpson .... " 
He also testified that after the of-ficers 1Hl.d thPm. 
Mr. Simpson told them that were to stick to their 
that they were aJl in it together, "that if one of ns said an;,c-
thing, we were just wringing our own neck. So he said stick to 
that story, they couldn't prove anything.'' On vigorous cross-
examination, he testified to substantially the same convenm-
tions having taken place. 
CrJARENcE's TERTIMONY 
Clarence Simpson, defendant's son, tcstifird in suhstfm-
tially the same vein as ,Jimmie ,} ones up until the point wlwre 
he is supposed to have asked if he was "to do it now." His 
testimony at the trial was that ;Jimmie said to him "We hettrr 
Oct. PEOPLE v. SIMPSON 
[43 C.2d 553; 275 P.2d 31] 
561 
go " that he couldn't it out of the truck, but 
,Jimmie did and handed it to him saying ''Go ahead and use 
it"; that he then walked a ways and shot his mother because 
to rid of my little brother and ,Jimmie told 
I lost my " Clarence then testified that ,Jimmie 
that "you better say you stumbled over the stake." 
while association with ,Jimmie and his 
father at the times to by ,Jimmie, denied that there 
had been any of any kind made to kill his mother. He ad-
mitted the gun and hiding it in the half finiRhed house 
belonging to a neighbor. He testified that he told ,Jimmie that 
he didn't think the officers would believe the story they had 
told and that ,Jimmie said, "Well, we better tell that your Dad 
put us up to it, we had this all planned up, that we was going 
to go fishing on Sunday and on Saturday we was going to 
hold the gun and fool around with the gun in the house and 
make it look like an accident, then we could say that my Dad 
just put it off and told us to do it that night." 
A statement made by Clarence on March 12, 1953, in the 
district attorney's office was admitted for the purpose of im-
peaching testimony given by him at the trial. In that state-
ment, Clarence said that he and his father had been planning 
the "accident" for two weeks; that his dad had wanted the 
boys to do it and that he, defendant, did not want to be around 
>Yhen it was done. He also stated that on 'l'uesday night. the 
defendant had said that maybe they ought to "do it tonig·ht, 
get it over with." In his statement, Clarence said that his 
mother was going to kill him and that he shot her in self-
defense and also that he had shot her accidentally because he 
had stumbled; that it was not self-defense and that he had not 
stumbled. He also stated that for over a month his father 
had been telling him that his mother would have to be killed 
before she killed Clarence; that the plans were all made, but 
that he waRn 't going to go through with it. 
DEPENDANT'S TESTIMONY 
Defenclant denied having made any planE; with either his 
son or Jimmie Jones. Concerning the occurrences on the nigllt 
of the killing, he testified that his wife was having an argu-
ment with Jimmie when he came home and that the argument 
then turned into abuse of him, the defendant; that he went to 
Mr. Parker's home and tried to get him to go home with him; 
that Clarence and ,Timmie eame running after him; that 
,Jimmie said Mrs. Simpson was after l1im with a gun. He 
then testified that he and the two boys went back to the 
562 PEOPLE v. SIMPSON [43 C.2d 
home where an 
was dark; that he heard a shot and his 
I'm ' ; that he couldn't see; that he didn't 
own knowledge who fired the shot; that Jimmie 
him that ''the gun went off "'"'clL'""""u· 
over that horseshoe ' ; that he 
bors and told them 
testified that after the officers 
he went to :Mr. Johnson 
OTHER TESTIMONY 
Officer McDaniels testified that the 
1953, he went to the home where 
less body of Vivian He testified that Clarence told 
him that he had over a peg and 
that defendant had told him either that the 
the stake or that the had told him ( 
tripped. 
Johnson, brother of the deceased Vivian testified 
that on the night of the defendant came to his home 
and said he had some ''sad news''; that '' shot Vivian 
while he was cleaning the gun to go fishing"; that she was 
"pretty bad hurt" but professed not to know what hospital 
she was in; that the man with defendant (identified later as 
Mr. Bishop) told him she was in a funeral 
On the morning after the murder, a Jl.frs. Coldwell 
called at the Simpson home to offer to take care of the chil-
dren. She testified that the defendant told her that he didn't 
know why the boys had to go out and 
wasn't there; that his wife had been 
while the boys were in the room 
when it went off. 
CoRROBORATioN' OF JIMMIE .JoNEs' TEsTniWNY 
Defendant contends that the by Jimmie 
,Jones is inherently improbable and that it was not corrob-
orated by other evidence to connect the defendant 
with the crime. (Pen. Code,§ 1111.) 
[1, 2] In answer to defendant's contention that Jimmie 
Jones' testimony was inherently the rule is well 
settled that to warrant the of the statements given 
by a witness who has been believed by a or trial court, 
there must exist either a physical that are 
true, or their falsity mnst be without to 
inferences or deductions (People v. Huston, 21 Cal.2c1 690, 








commission of the crime in such a way 
that the accomplice is telling 
40 Ca1.2d 156 [252 P.2d 
pp. P.2d 249] ; 
Cal.2d 814, 822 [264 P.2d 547]). 
[5] Proof of the elements of the as contrasted with 
of the connection of defendant with the commission 
the uncorroborated testimony of an 
25 Cal.2d 862, 876, 877 [156 
V. Kll'r£'11111 
Mrs. Christian, a neighbor of the Simpson family, 
testified that about a year prior to the murder, she, her hus-
and Mr. Simpson l1ad taken a trip to Atwater in the 
Christian car; that on that trip, defendant sho·wcd her a gun 
he was and said that he would have to get rid of 
his wife and that ''It's to be an accident.'' Mrs. Chris-
tian testified that on Monday March 9, the defendant 
told her that "Clarence 1vould have to kill her [Vivian] 
because she wns not supposed to live any more, he couldn't 
>vith her"; and tl1at he told her if "yon hear 'Pop,' 
you don't know about it.'' 
Bill husband of Mary, confirmed his wife's testi-
mony concerning the Atwater trip and testified that defend-
ant said then that his wife had to be killed and that Clarence 
would kill her. He also testified concerning the hiding of the 
gun in the house he was rebuilding and stated that when Clar-
ence, ,Jimmie, and the defendant came back to where the gun 
was hidden, defendant said to him "Bill, we're going to have 
to kill that woman,'' and ''Clarence is going to have to kill 
her." 
Donald Dodge, the 16-year-old son of the deceased woman, 
testified concerning the quarrels between defendant and his 
wife and also concerning various threats made by defendant 
564 PEOPLE v. SnrPso~ 
to deceased. He stated that defendant had told 
time to the killing, that he was to 
C.2d 
gate off the cattle truck on her and make it look like an acci-
dent; that defendant said to Vivian ''I'm to kill you 
and make it look like an accident. I'll have Clarence do it.'' 
[6] False and contradictory statements of a defendant 
in relation to the charge are themselvefl corroborative evidence 
(People v. 70 Cal.App. 244 P. ; People 
v. ante, pp. 327 [273 P.2d ). Defendant 
made various contradictory statements : that Clarence had 
stumbled over a stake and accidentally shot his mother; that 
he didn't know which one of the boys shot the gun; that Clar-
ence shot his mother accidentally while the gun 
preparatory to going on a fishing trip. Mrs. Coldwell testi-
fied that defendant told her that Mrs. Simpson had been 
standing at the sink, with her back to the boys, and that the 
gun went off accidentally while it was being cleaned. 
[7] The evidence just set forth is sufficient to connect 
the defendant with the crime in such a way as reasonably may 
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. It is 
not necessary that the accomplice be corroborated as to every 
fact to which he testified. (People v. Barclay, supra.) 
[8] Briefly summarized, the corroborative evidence consid-
ered together with the facts heretofore set forth, shows that 
during the marital life of the parties, defendant had abused 
his wife, had threatened to kill her, and, for more than a year 
prior to the killing, had planned to have Clarence commit 
the crime and make it look like an accident. For this reason, 
the cases of People v. Petree, 109 Cal.App.2d 184 [240 P.2d 
327], (see People v. Jordan, 115 Cal.App.2d 452 [252 P.2d 
328] ) and People v. Lima, 25 Cal.2d 573 [154 P .2d 698], 
relied upon by defendant, are not in point. Defendant relies 
upon the rule set forth in those cases that if the corroborative 
evidence raises only a suspicion of guilt it is not sufficient 
under section 1111 of the Penal Code. The rule as stated by 
defendant is correct, but the corroborative evidence hereto-
fore set forth does more than raise a suspicion of guilt on the 
part of defendant and is ample to connect him with the crime 
and satisfy the jury that the accomplice told the truth. 
INSTRUCTION ON REASONABLE DOUBT 
It is contended by defendant that the following instruction, 
given at the request of the People, had the effect of placing 
upon defendant the burden of proving his innocence and re-
Oct. PEOPJ_,E v. SDIPSON 
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his guilt, and 
should not find the defendant 
of any offense unless his guilt is established by the 
evidence to a moral and beyond all reasonable doubt, 
and the burden is on the to establish such guilt. 
'' 'rhe presumes every man innocent until his guilt is 
established to a moral and beyond all reasonable 
this attaches at every stage of the 
case, and to every fact essential to a conviction. 
"Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: 'It is not a mere 
doubt; because everything relating to human affairs 
and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt.' It is that state of the case, which, after 
the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, 
leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot 
say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of 
the truth of the charge. 
"\¥hile presumptions of Jaw, independent of evidence, are 
in favor of innocence, and every man is presumed to be inno-
cent until proven guilty, yet if the evidence establishes the 
truth of the charge to a reasonable moral certainty, a cer-
tainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satis-
fies the reason and judgment of those who are to act conscien-
tiously upon it is your duty to find the defendant guilty. 
The law does not require demonstration or that degree of proof 
which excludes all possibility of error and produces absolute 
certainty. Such proof is rarely available. Moral certainty 
only is required or that degree of proof which produces con-
victim1 in an unprejudiced mind. 
''The term 'reasonable doubt,' as used in these instructions, 
means a doubt ·which has some good reason* for its existence 
arising out of evidence in the case* ; such doubt as you are able 
to find a reason for in the evidence.* As applied to the evi-
flence in criminal cases, it means an actual and substantt"al 
doubt growing out of the u.nsatisfactory natnre of the evi-
dence* in the case. It does not mean a doubt which arises 
from some mere whim or vagary or from any groundless sur-
mise, suspicion or guess.'' 
[9] ·while the court was not restricted to the reading of 
section 1096 of the Penal Code defining reasonable doubt (see 
People v. Derenzo, 46 Cal.App.2d 411, 416 [115 P.2d 858]; 
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PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF DISTRICT ATTORXEY 
It appears from the record that defendant consulted Mr. 
Pierson, the deputy district who the case 
for the People, on June 14, relative to a divorce from his 
wife, Vivian. The divorce was never tried since the 
couple were reconciled in October. Prior to the 
in August, defendant secured another 
him. 
It is contended by defendant that from the representa-
tion, Mr. Pierson gained superior of his affairs with 
his wife, Vivian, and that the prejudice to him from 
this superior knowledge was demonstrated JI.Ir. Pier-
son's cross-examination. Defendant cites several 
of this cross-examination but does not show how it could have 
resulted to his prejudice. [11] An illustration concerns 
certain letters defendant introduced in evidence. These let-
ters were four of apparently a number of letters written to him 
by Vivian at one time when she had left him and were intro-
duced to show that she was reconciled with him and that they 
could live together harmonously. 1\'Ir. Pierson asked defend-
ant why he had four of letters and defendant 
contends that the question that Mr. Pierson knew of 
other letters of a different tenor. In answer to Pierson's 
question, the defendant replied that Pierson had advised him 
that the four were all that would be needed for evidence. It 
is contended that this answer "reinforced" the unfavorable 
inference. In support of his that the district 
occupied u"""'"'" 
tine v. Stewart, 15 387, Wntch1nnna Water Co. v. Bailey, 
216 Cal. 564 [15 P.2d 505], and Pennix v. 61 CaJ.App. 
2d 761 [143 P.2d 940, 145 P.2d In the Valentine case, 
the attorney had represented the in a land claim 
567 
so 
on the opposite 
the 
use confidential 
and information virtue of that former 
In the Pennix case, an action for personal in-
was involved. The defendant's showed that 
he had formed an intent to act in the interest of de-
even to the extent of accusing 
fUacu>-cu>- of in collusion with 
the intent to defraud the insurance company. It was held 
that error had occurred and the case was reversed. 
In 61 Cal. 128, the attorney who drew the 
indictment for the charge, represented the defendant 
at the triaL 'l'he court held that there could not be such an 
assumption of inconsistent positions. 
It would appear that the cases cited by defendant are not 
similar to the situation under consideration. Here, Mr. 
Pierson had defendant briefly in a divorce action 
which did not come to trial but was dismissed, and defendant 
had other counsel for another divorce action prior 
to the time at hand; that action, too, was dismissed. It should 
also be noted that no objection was made by defense counsel 
at the time the matter was made known in the trial of the 
case at bar. Neither was objection made at that time that it 
was Mr. Pierson's "superior knowledge" that prompted him 
to question defendant concerning the other letters which had 
not been introduced in evidence by the defendant. 
[12] It is also argued that on another occasion, Mr. Pier-
son challenged the veracity of the defendant and stated that 
"If he [defendant J keeps it up, I'm going to have to take 
the stand." The transcript shows that during Mr. Pierson's 
cross-examination of defendant concerning the size of a book 
with which defendant stated his wife had struck Clarence, 
defendant would only gesture and ·would refuse to give an 
answer that "Yon [Mr. Pierson) have seen it." Mr. 
Pierson, during a heated exchange between himself, defense 
counsel, and the court, stated: "In these answers Mr. Simpson 
is giving, I don't know whether he wants me to take the stand 
and answer these statements he is making about me or not. 
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If he it up, I'm " It 
does not appear that the ques-
the of the endeavor-
ing to make a point for the record; that defendant did not 
understand what was expected of him; that Mr. Pierson meant 
that he would have to take the stand to as to the size 
of the book. 
[13] Another alleged suffered defendant 
cnrred when Pierson to recall to defendant's son 
Billy's mind whether he had ever heard his father say any-
thing "bad" about his mother. During the recross-examina-
tion, Mr. Pierson asked Billy if he remembered around 
when his father talked to him (Pierson) and Billy replied that 
he did not-that he only remembered going to Mr. Pierson's 
office once. 
Defendant's argument that the deputy district attorney 
stated to the jury that he had ''checked'' on defendant's 
story and that he, Mr. Pierson, had not been "mesmerized" 
by defendant, is not borne out by the record. It is apparent 
that it was defendant who had done the ''checking'' and that 
the statement concerning ''mesmerized'' was a quotation from 
defense counsel's argument to the jury: '' 'Do you think,' 
says Mr. Friedman, 'that he mesmerized Mr. Pierson?'" 
There was no assignment of prejudicial misconduct by defense 
counsel and, furthermore, it is difficult to see how such re-
marks could have prejudiced the defendant. 
[14] Still another contention that the district attorney 
was guilty of prejudicial misconduct is the allegation that 
"two pages of the transcript" were used in arguing to the 
jury facts not in evidence. In particular, complaint is made 
concerning the statement "She's going to kill your little 
brothers'' in that there was no such testimony concerning the 
child Gary. Jimmie Jones testified that defendant told him 
and Clarence, on several occasions, that "if we didn't get her 
she was going to get us"; defendant himself told one Eldon 
Marxmiller, a witness for the People, that "I am going to 
get rid of her or she is going to get rid of me and the boys'' ; 
Clarence testified that one of the reasons why he shot his 
mother was because ''she was going to get rid of my little 
brother." It would appear that the evidence justifiably per-
mitted the inference that the use of the word "boys" meant 
all of them, including Gary. 
[15] Another allegation of prejudicial misconduct on the 




any any more, you 
she's to take it away. 
take it away. 
to use him for the au"'~''""·' 
want She's 
she this divorce 
misconduct by Mr. 
CouRT: I Mr. 
ting in an inference there. I'm sure that .,,.,,l'"t.hi 
you said, Mr. say to the little boys, it 
evidence. 
"MR. PIERSON: I'll withdraw my statement Your 
Honor, if there is any about that, I'll withdraw it 
and ask that the .jury because I cer-
don 't want to put isn't 
there.'' 
The court thereupon au=u•.uE,uvu the 
statement made Mr. 
to the same was also 
There is no direct testimony in the record concerning the 
statement to Mr. Simpson the There 
however, testimony he asked his 
what was 
later he and 
that later his 
the and had taken a or 
was afraid mother would some of 
the papers and his father previously told him that 
she had taken some and hidden Donald Dodge tes1t:tn<:\U 
that and Vivian often quarreled about the custoay 
of the upon ; that Vivian wanted Gary 
but that defendant did not agree ; couple ""''""""' 
home property. Other evidence 
that on several occasions, pointed out to 
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to statements admitted 
purposes as affirmatiYe cYidenec i11 the case. 
'l'his contention is not tbe reeord which shows 
that the evidence 1ms eomrasted to the testi-
mony the witnesses when on the stand. Purthermore, 
there was no assignment of prejudicial misconduct at the 
time. Iicferences to the "malevolent P')Wcr" of Mr. Simpson 
over Clarence which forced Clarence to "parrot the fanciful 
stories that l\Ir. Simpson had in his mind" were not 
objected to at the time ·were made and no is now 
made that defendant could haYe been prejudiced thereby. 
[17] It is contended that a statement by the dis-
trict attorney that when Me. Walters first heard about the 
death of l\irs. Simpson, he went to the sheriff's office to inform 
them, was a misstatement of the evidence. l\lr. Jjlriedman 
stated that l\T r. \V alters' testimony \Yas that he had been sent 
for by the sheriff. Mr. Pierson replied that he did not recall 
the exact testimony and upon the court's question "Did he 
want to argue about it~" 1\Ir. Pierson "I knmv the 
facts on it but I don't recall what the \Yas." 'l'he 
court then asked if he wished to concede the point and let it 
go, to which Pierson that he would not make an issue 
of the question. There was no assignment of prejm1ieinl mis-
conduct and no sho·wing of prejudice since this partien1ar mat-
ter was quite immaterial concerning the or innoeencc 
of the defendant. The eases cited by defendant (People Y. 
Kirkes, 39 Cal.2d 719, 724 [249 P.2d 1]; People v. Evans, 39 
Cal.2d 242 [246 P.2d 6:36]; People v. Brophlf, 122 Cal.App.2d 
638, 651 f265 P.2d 593] ; People v. Ford, 89 Ca1.App.2d 467, 
470 [200 P.2d 867]; People v. Cook. 148 Cal. :134 [8:1 P. 34]) 
are not in point. In the Kirkes ease, the c1istrirt attorney 
stated that he knew the defendant was guilty; in the Evans 
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an erroneous instruetion 1vas eon-
for reversal. 
In v. snpm, 148 Ual the pt·oseeution 
argued to the that the defendant had srnt one man to 
prison beeause he to his daughter and the de-
fendant ·was therefore and eH of killing upon the 
same ineltement. There was no evidenee of m1y kind pertain-
ing to the alleged statement; the eourt refused to so instruet 
i he and thr a c:onrt reyersed. 
In all of the eases relied upon by deffmdant, the damaging 
nature of the is at once apparent. 
[18] Drfendant's last contention is that the evidence doel': 
not justify the verdict. It is defendant's argnment that siuee 
he did not fire the fatal, or any, shot and yet reeeiwd the rleatJ1 
penalty, the record should be scrutinized this eourt with 
even care. the evidence most fayorably in 
support of the judgment as ·we are bmm!l to we feel that 
thene is no merit to defendant's contrntion. 
Gibson, r. Shenk, J., Rdmonch;, J., 'I'raynor, .J., Sehauer . 
. T.. and Sprnee, .J., eoneurrecl. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November 
24, 1954. 
